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The general election on 7th May 2015 is not only going to lead to radical 
changes in the political landscape. Britain will also have to come up with 
answers to the European, Scottish and English questions. How this can 
be done is a moot point. At any rate, it is not going to make EU policy-
making any easier.
On 15th June the country will be celebrating 
the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta, 
which is the basis of English law and indeed 
of mo dern democracy. But not everyone is go-
ing to be in a festive mood. The fact of the 
matter is that after the forthcoming general 
election the United Kingdom is going to slide 
ineluctably into a constitutional crisis. Old 
habits and customs are fading away into 
oblivion, and the new ones have not as yet 
demonstrated that they can hold their own 
and survive. Since 1885 the Government and 
the Opposition have sat facing each other in 
the House of Commons two swords’ length 
apart. Yet what came into being in the Pa-
lace of Westminster at the time of Queen 
Victoria as a clear-cut two-party system is 
disintegrating in the latter part of the reign of 
Queen Elizabeth II and becoming a fragmented 
seven-party system with unsuspected and 
sometimes seemingly impossible alliances.
This means that the tacit agreement between 
the electorate and those it elects has lost its 
validity. For 130 years “first past the post” has 
been the golden rule of the British simple plu-
rality voting system. What this means is that 
the largest party, no matter whether it was 
the Labour Party or the Conservative Party, 
obtained a clear-cut majority that enabled it 
to govern. It also made it impossible for small 
parties to participate in a government. For 
many decades this system was stable, unfair, 
and yet efficient. But that is now a thing of the 
past. The electorate and the politicians were 
wrong to assume that the current coalition 
of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats was 
simply a fluke occurrence in the context of 
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Source: www.may2015.com, www.electoralcommission.org.uk © Bertelsmann Stiftung
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General election results 2010 and forecast May 2015
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258 57 2 6 1 27306 273 325 55 1 4271
29 23 3.1 1.7 1 6.136.1 33.5 13.58.3 3.9 4.7 2.433.7
has emerged in the run-up to the election, and 
that it has been “filled by the ‘antis:’ the anti-
elite, the anti-European, the anti-immigrant 
and the anti-capitalist.” 
What we are faced with today is a Disunited 
Kingdom. The United Kingdom that emerged 
in the Victorian era is a thing of the past. 
However, as we will see in what follows, the 
country is fragmented not only with regard to 
party politics, but also and increasingly in so-
cial and geographical terms. This has certain 
consequences for the EU, which is the island’s 
most important partner. 
David Cameron, the Conservative prime min-
ister, has promised that if he is re-elected, he 
will permit the British electorate to decide by 
2017 at the latest whether the UK should con-
tinue to be a member of the European Union or 
whether it should withdraw. In a survey com-
missioned by the think tank Chatham House 
sixty percent of the interviewees supported 
him on this point. Only 24 percent rejected 
the old system, and that things would quickly 
return to normal. In future Britain is going to 
see seven players (and not only three) in the 
House of Commons — two big ones, the Labour 
Party and the Conservative Party, and the Lib-
erals, the UKIP, the Green Party and the Scot-
tish and Welsh Nationalists.
On 21st February 2015 “The Economist” stat-
ed that “Britain’s slide into six-party politics 
presages instability and a crisis of legitimacy.” 
It went on to say that “almost all the running 
has been made by three insurgents: the Scot-
tish National Party (SNP), which wants Scot-
land out of Britain; the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP), which wants Britain out of Europe; 
and the Green Party, which wants “hyper-capi-
talism” out of both Britain and Europe. It is the 
biggest shake-up since the early 20th century, 
when Labour displaced the Liberals.” The “Fi-
nancial Times” sees things in much the same 
way, and has talked about “the great fragmen-
tation.” Philip Stephens, its chief political com-
mentator, believes that a vacuum of legitimacy 
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such a referendum. When all is said and done, 
a very small majority (40 percent for and 39 
percent against) would now vote to keep the 
UK in the EU, and it is rising slowly.
Currently commentators in other countries 
like to focus on the decision for and against EU 
membership to the exclusion of all else. How-
ever, that is a rather superficial way of looking 
at this EU member state. Even if Britain votes 
to remain in the European Union, its domestic 
situation and thus British policy in the EU will 
continue to be at the mercy of the profound 
shifts and changes which we will now examine 
in greater detail.
A concomitant of the tendency to focus pri-
marily on “Brexit,” that is, on the possibility 
that the United Kingdom will leave the EU, is 
the coverage of the rise of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) and its popular 
leader, Nigel Farage. He is stealing the show 
from the established parties both with regard 
to European policy (90 percent of UKIP sup-
porters are in favour of leaving the EU) and 
increasingly on the subject of immigration 
policy. Farage, a long-standing MEP, used to 
be a commodities trader in the City, is of Hu-
guenot descent, and was educated at a pres-
tigious school, Dulwich College. His second 
wife is German. Although he is obviously a 
member of the Establishment, he manages in 
an astoni shing way to give the impression that 
he is an anti-establishment figure, even if it is 
just by posing with a pint of beer in front of a 
pub. He is far more effective in the media than 
Alex Salmond, who is actually a very popu-
lar fi gure. The former leader of the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) has now handed over the 
reins to party colleague Nicola Sturgeon.
Of course in domestic policy terms the pro-
European SNP has become at least as influen-
tial as the UKIP. After the Scottish indepen-
dence referendum on 18th September 2014 
many people, and especially David Cameron, 
the prime minister, were totally convinced 
that the issue had been settled once and for 
all. This is certainly not the case. Despite the 
SNP’s lack of success at the ballot box, its 
membership has more than tripled, and has 
risen from 25,000 to over 90,000. It should 
be borne in mind that in Scotland Labour and 
the Tories, the two “big” parties, each have 
about 20,000 members.
On 7th May the party that was defeated on 
18th September, if the polls are anything to go 
by, is going to witness its greatest triumph. It 
will be getting a helping hand from both electo-
ral law and the status of Scotland. There are 
59 Scottish seats in the House of Commons. 
At the end of March the polls indicated that 
on this occasion the SNP will probably get as 
many as 55 of them (primarily at the expense 
of Labour, which has traditionally received 
strong support in the far north), even though 
in national terms it has only four or five per-
cent of the votes.
In the middle of April Labour and the Tories 
were running neck to neck. 33.5 percent of the 
interviewees expressed a preference for left-
wing candidates, and 33.7 percent expressed 
a preference for right-wing candidates. At the 
beginning of the 1950s they received 97 per-
cent of the votes, and in those days there were 
only two MPs in the House of Commons who 
did not belong to one of the two parties. Now 
there are 85. However, under the present sys-
tem two-thirds of the votes are still enough in 
order to secure 90 percent of the seats. The 
UKIP is set to obtain 13.5 percent, the Liberals 
8.3 percent, and the Green Party 4.7 percent. 
Taken together they will be getting about a 
quarter of the votes, but even in a best-case 
scenario only a tenth of the 650 seats in the 
House of Commons. Ulrich Storck, the head 
of the London office of the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, has pointed out that the “general 
election on 7th May is the least predictable in 
British history.”
The fact that Nick Clegg and the Liberal Demo-
crats have been such a failure has prompted 
the UKIP and the Green Party to reject the 
whole idea of a coalition. The SNP does not see 
it that way. It shares many of the convictions 
of the Labour Party, especially when it comes 
to the welfare state. The price for entering into 
a coalition could well be a second referendum 
on independence. This will almost certainly 
be held if the United Kingdom leaves the EU 
in 2017. The Scots are in fact loyal Europeans. 
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of Northern Ireland.” In this area the Conserva-
tives are driving a wedge into the United King-
dom that is similar to the one they have driven 
between the UK and the rest of Europe.
In recent times the rise of Scottish nationalism 
and the greater powers given to the Scottish 
Parliament before and after the independence 
referendum have prompted people to reconsid-
er the meaning of “Englishness.” Such ques-
tions are not merely about identity. They are 
also about appropriate political representation. 
Conservatives and members of the UKIP (who 
are especially interested in this issue) have 
taken to asking why Scottish MPs are permit-
ted to vote in the House of Commons on laws 
which primarily affect the English. Thus the 
Scottish question is not only a European issue. 
It is also an English one. There are 650 MPs 
in the House of Commons, and 533 represent 
constituencies in England, which is where 
85% of the people of Britain live. However, un-
like the Welsh, the Scots and the Northern 
Irish the English do not have a parliament of 
their own. Since 1977 this constitutional di-
lemma has been referred to as the “West Lo-
thian question” in the British debate. At the 
time the Labour MP for the West Lothian con-
stituency came up with the following question. 
“For how long will English constituencies and 
English Honourable members tolerate … at 
least 119 Honourable Members from Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland exercising an im-
portant, and probably often decisive, effect on 
English politics while they themselves have 
no say in the same matters in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland?” 
Vernon Bogdanor believes that at the heart of 
this dilemma there are, strictly speaking, two 
basic questions. “This means that legislation 
affecting the health service, schools or hous-
ing in England can be put on the statute book 
as a result of the votes of Scottish MPs, while 
English MPs no longer have responsibility for 
these matters in Scotland.”
An English parliament would of course seem 
to be a logical solution. However, within a fed-
eral system this would represent 85 percent 
of the population, a state of affairs that exists 
nowhere else in the world. Another solution 
Vernon Bogdanor, a political scientist at King’s 
College London, has pointed out that this 
means that the European question and the 
Scottish question are meeting head-on. “Nico-
la Sturgeon, the SNP leader, has indicated that 
such an outcome would not be accepted as le-
gitimate in Scotland and that Scotland cannot 
be forced out of the European Union without 
its consent. She has argued that a mandate 
for the United Kingdom to leave the European 
Union can only be achieved through the con-
sent of each of its constituent parts – England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.”
As it happens, the European question has 
reared its ugly head in another part of the 
Disunited Kingdom. The Cameron government 
would also like to redefine its membership of 
the Council of Europe, and thus to evade be-
ing subject to the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights. However, this policy 
is not consonant with the Belfast Agreement 
of 1998. At the time the people of Northern 
Ireland were assured that on account of the vi-
cious civil war between Unionists and National-
ists they would be given “rights supplementary 
to those in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances 
Percent of respondents
Source: Chatham House, YouGov Survey, 08/2014 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
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would be a series of regional parliaments in 
England, since these would split up the 85 per-
cent into more manageable units. However, as 
Bogdanor points out, such a plan would have 
to overcome other obstacles. “The truth is that, 
in England, by contrast with many countries 
on the Continent and by contrast with federal 
states such as the United States and Canada, 
there is little regional feeling. Most people in 
England feel that they belong to a town and 
a county but not to a region. In England, the 
regions are little more than ghosts.”
The fault lines are not only between Scot-
land and England, but increasingly within 
England itself. There are roughly 54 million 
people in England, and almost 14 million of 
them, that is, about one in three, live in the 
Greater London area. “A political and cultur-
al chasm has opened up between London, still 
the global hub of 2012, and a less prosperous 
English hinterland.” The City, which was all 
the rage in the era of Cool Britannia, has ac-
quired a bad name with the man in the street 
in England (and elsewhere) in the wake of the 
banking crisis and a whole series of banking 
scandals. In 1983 the British Social Attitudes 
Survey revealed that 90 percent of the elector-
ate believed that banks were well-managed in-
stitutions. In 2012 only 19% were of this opin-
ion. London now has a tarnished reputation. 
On 5th March 2015 the “Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung” published an article entitled 
“The Black Money Capital” which claimed that 
36,000 properties in London are owned by 
anonymous letterbox companies in offshore 
centres such as the British Virgin Islands 
and the Isle of Man. Many of these expensive 
buildings are empty. They are simply a good 
place “to park large sums of money.”
A federal structure is not a feasible option as 
far as the United Kingdom is concerned, and 
so one is led to ask whether there are any 
 other possible solutions.
Since 2001 the Conservatives, in their politi-
cal mani festos, have propagated the idea of 
Source: Chatham House, YouGov Survey, 08/2014 © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Percentage of respondents, general public
Give governments powers back
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The BBC Lab UK Great British Class Survey, 
which was conducted in 2013, defined seven 
social classes in modern British society on 
the basis of economic, social and cultural 
indicators.
At the top of the pyramid there is an elite 
which has the highest scores in all three areas. 
Next come the established middle class, the 
largest group; a technical middle class which 
scores low for social capital and is distin-
guished by cultural apathy; the new affluent 
workers, a young and socially and culturally 
active group; the traditional working class, the 
members of which have the highest average 
age, 66, and frequently own a small property; 
and the emergent service workers, a young ur-
ban group which has high social and cultural 
capital. And finally there is the precariat (or 
precarious proletariat), the poorest class. 
This social fragmentation has now spilt over 
into the political space. Voters are no longer 
right-wing or left-wing. They have become 
political consumers who have rather high 
expectations with regard to politics and politi-
cians. Their voting behaviour is both change-
able and choosy.
The “Financial Times” sums up the situation 
as follows.  “Britain needs a new way of gover-
ning itself and a new story — a binding narra-
tive that affords due respect to the past but is 
no longer imprisoned by it.”
According to the Chatham House-YouGov Sur-
vey, in Britain almost two-thirds of the popu-
lation are in favour of trying to achieve the 
status of a great power (which is not quite 
the same as the German term “Großmacht-
Status.”) Yet this is not really on the cards, 
since there are simply not enough financial 
resources. The current government, which is 
made up of Conservatives and Liberals, has 
slashed the budgets for foreign relations and 
defence, and within the framework of the EU 
has vetoed many things that could have con-
tributed to such a status. This is the reason 
why Washington keeps repeating that the 
“special relationship” between the US and the 
UK is in bad shape. The Minsk agreement with 
Vladimir Putin was negotiated by the German 
“English votes for English laws.” Bogdanor 
warns that this would lead to a divided or 
“bifurcated” House of Commons. The English 
would vote on health and educational legisla-
tion, and all British MPs would be entitled to 
vote on defence and economic policy. Thus in 
the case of a Labour-SNP coalition, which is a 
distinct possibility, this kind of division or bi-
furcation will always come into play whenever 
the government is for ced to fall back on the 
votes of the Scottish MPs.
Risks and side-effects are part and parcel 
of all these scenarios. People have stopped 
thinking about their shared heritage and 
what they have in common, or, to put it an-
other way, about the United Kingdom as a 
whole, and have taken to emphasizing the di-
visive aspects and the differences between its 
constituent parts. 
Old ties and links are becoming increasingly 
unimportant because more and more powers 
are being taken away from Westminster. The 
trend to more “devolution” in Britain contin-
ues unabated. Thus the British do not have a 
problem only with the European Union. They 
also have a problem with their own union, 
which began to be forged towards the end of 
the sixteenth century and was subsequently 
enshrined in the Acts of Union.
The changes in the party landscape have 
been occasioned primarily by social factors, 
and to a certain extent by political constraints 
and the issue of identity. The Labour / Tory 
duopoly, which lasted for more than a hun-
dred years, was of course aided and abetted 
by the simple plurality voting system, though 
in the final analysis it has its roots in Brit-
ish notions and perceptions of a class society. 
The workers and salaried employees were 
loyal to Labour, which they regarded as a kind 
of family. On the other hand, generations of 
bourgeois voters and aristocrats thought of 
themselves as members of the Tory tribe. 
An analysis of the current situation in “The 
Economist” comes to the following conclusion. 
“As the British class system has given way to 
a mish-mash of socio-economic groupings, 
tribal loyalties to Labour and the Conserva-
tives have evaporated.“
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chancellor and the French president. The Brit-
ish prime minister was not even asked to par-
ticipate. The same thing happened in Septem-
ber 2014 when President Obama was trying 
to forge a coalition against the Islamic State. 
This kind of policymaking does not tally with 
the grand statements that were made in the 
government’s “Strategic Defence and Security 
Review 2010.” “Our country has always had 
global responsibilities and global ambitions. 
We have a proud history of standing up for the 
values we believe in.”
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The UK has been weakened internally. In eco-
nomic terms it is dependent on the City, the 
world’s greatest financial services centre. And, 
although no one has forced it to do so, it has 
retreated to the sidelines in the EU and on the 
global stage. British politicians should own 
up to the fact that there is a yawning gap be-
tween their assertions and the reality of the 
situation. Saying no to the European Union 
will simply deepen this chasm. But even if it 
were to say yes, an increasingly turbulent and 
strife-ridden Britain is going to be a difficult 
partner in the EU.
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